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Abstract
Background: Because smallpox (variola major) may be used as a biological weapon, we reviewed
outbreaks in post-World War II Europe and North America in order to understand smallpox
transmission patterns.
Methods: A systematic review was used to identify papers from the National Library of Medicine,
Embase, Biosis, Cochrane Library, Defense Technical Information Center, WorldCat, and
reference lists of included publications. Two authors reviewed selected papers for smallpox
outbreaks.
Results: 51 relevant outbreaks were identified from 1,389 publications. The median for the
effective first generation reproduction rate (initial R) was 2 (range 0–38). The majority outbreaks
were small (less than 5 cases) and contained within one generation. Outbreaks with few
hospitalized patients had low initial R values (median of 1) and were prolonged if not initially
recognized (median of 3 generations); outbreaks with mostly hospitalized patients had higher initial
R values (median 12) and were shorter (median of 3 generations). Index cases with an atypical
presentation of smallpox were less likely to have been diagnosed with smallpox; outbreaks in which
the index case was not correctly diagnosed were larger (median of 27.5 cases) and longer (median
of 3 generations) compared to outbreaks in which the index case was correctly diagnosed (median
of 3 cases and 1 generation).
Conclusion: Patterns of spread during Smallpox outbreaks varied with circumstances, but early
detection and implementation of control measures is a most important influence on the magnitude
of outbreaks. The majority of outbreaks studied in Europe and North America were controlled
within a few generations if detected early.
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Background
The anthrax attacks that followed the events of September
11th, 2001 focused attention on the threat of terrorism
with biological agents including variola major, the causa-
tive agent of smallpox [1]. There is concern that an attack
with smallpox could result in many deaths because of the
susceptibility of the U.S. population [2-8]. A number of
issues, such as the amount of virus released and the
number of people exposed, need to be considered in order
to estimate the impact of a bioterrorist attack with small-
pox. However, one key factor in determining the size of an
outbreak resulting from such an attack is the transmissi-
bility of smallpox, which can be difficult to estimate. One
measure of transmissibility is the effective reproductive
rate (R), which is equal to the expected number of infec-
tions produced by an infectious host in a real world set-
ting [5,9-11].
R can be determined in a straightforward manner for indi-
vidual epidemics and is related to the circumstances, such
as population vaccination status, under which the indi-
vidual epidemics occur. When considering intentional
attacks, the greatest interest lies in initial spread, much of
which often occurs before an outbreak is recognized. For
this reason, we focused on the transmission from index
cases to the first generation of secondary cases, which we
termed the initial R.
The data for this study was obtained from a systematic lit-
erature review for reports of smallpox outbreaks. We lim-
ited our review to reports of smallpox outbreaks occurring
in Europe and North America after 1945 because these
societies were much more similar to the modern United
States in terms of their demographic, social, and physical
structure, than were the pre-World War II western and the
developing societies from which most smallpox outbreak
reports have emanated. Moreover, population immunity
was also relatively more similar to a contemporary US
population than might be expected a priori. While early
post-war European and North American populations were
generally vaccinated in childhood, re-vaccination rates
were generally low and few adults had more than remote
vaccination [12,13]. Immunity naturally acquired
through infection was also similarly low in both popula-
tions because outbreaks were rare. Although terrorist use
of smallpox in the 21st century may have substantially dif-
ferent epidemiological characteristics (see discussion
below), the outbreaks analyzed in this paper are the clos-
est actual population experience that may help partially
guide modern smallpox control efforts.
Methods
Data collection
The following databases were searched for literature on
smallpox through 2001: National Library of Medicine
1800 to 2001 (keywords: smallpox or variola), Embase
1974 to 2001, Biosis 1969–2001 (keywords: smallpox or
variola virus and human and not in-vitro), Cochrane Con-
trolled Clinical Trials Library (keywords: smallpox or var-
iola) and Defense Technical Information Center 1947 to
2000 (keywords: smallpox). The search was later updated
by a PubMed search from 2001 to 2004 (keywords: small-
pox or variola). Duplicate titles were removed. Secondary
searches included more specific searches for outbreaks in
specific countries and sites, and a review of reference lists
from publications identified in other searches (Figure 1).
There was no language restriction.
Two authors (SB and VB) independently scanned titles for
relevance, and publications chosen by either reviewer
were reviewed further. One of the authors (VB) scanned
the selected articles to identify post-1945 smallpox out-
breaks from Europe and North America. Two abstractors
(RB or research associate and VB) independently extracted
data from the identified outbreaks. Discrepancies between
reviewers were resolved by consensus. Non-English publi-
cations were abstracted by one author (RB) or by a
research assistant under an author's (VB) direction.
To be included in the analysis, the following had to be
available: the date of occurrence, and the number of index
cases, total cases, cases in each generation, and genera-
tions. The following outbreak details were also extracted if
available: the number of cases acquired within a hospital,
a household, or at a distance (cases not acquired by
household or hospital contact); the number of missed
cases (cases not diagnosed as smallpox at the time of ill-
ness) and deaths; the generation at which the outbreak
was identified, and the clinical presentation of the index
case. Index cases were classified as having had typical
smallpox, atypical smallpox (a milder illness as seen in
people with prior smallpox vaccination and/or a rash not
characteristic of smallpox), or hemorrhagic smallpox (a
usually fatal illness characterized by internal hemorrhage
and/or petechiae) [14]. The following data regarding the
efficacy of control measures were also extracted if availa-
ble: the use of ring vaccination (the vaccination of people
who were in close contact with a patient with smallpox),
case isolation (the separation of suspected cases of small-
pox from the general public), quarantine (the restriction
of movement in or out of a region that has been exposed
to smallpox), mass vaccination (the vaccination of an
entire region), and/or prophylactic vaccinia immune
globulin administration [15-17].
Analysis
The number of outbreaks over the period studied was
small (total of 45 outbreaks) and the circumstances varied
widely. Therefore, a descriptive and qualitative analysis
was emphasized. For this analysis, the initial R was meas-BMC Public Health 2006, 6:126 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/126
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ured by dividing the total number of first generation cases
by the number of index (zeroth generation) cases. In addi-
tion, several outbreaks had sufficient details to be classi-
fied by setting. Because hospitals were often the centre of
outbreaks, setting was defined according to the propor-
tion of secondary cases (non-index cases) acquired within
a hospital [12,13,18-20]. After examination of the distri-
bution of case locations across outbreaks, hospital out-
breaks were defined those in which 70% or more of
secondary cases were hospital acquired, mixed outbreaks
as those in which 30% to 70% of secondary cases were
hospital-acquired, and community outbreaks as those in
which 30% or less of secondary cases were hospital-
acquired.
Results
Literature search
Based on the results of the primary searches, 5,976 titles
were scanned; 1,389 of these were selected. Despite initial
de-duplication, 10 of these were duplicates (Figure 1).
Secondary searches identified 14 additional publications.
Of the resulting 1,393 publications, 1219 (87%) were
obtained; 92 journal citations (7% of the selected publica-
tions) and 41 government reports (3% of the selected
publications) were unobtainable.
Forty-nine post-1945 European and North American out-
breaks were identified. Thirty-six of these were included in
a single World Health Organization (WHO) publication
[21] and prior work by T.M. Mack [12]. Several outbreaks
were documented in multiple publications (Tables 1 and
2). Four outbreaks were excluded. The source of the first
outbreak could not be confirmed as the outbreak may
have resulted from the importation of smallpox on a rug
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or U.S.S.R, 1959).
The second and third outbreaks occurred under unique
circumstances; one occurred aboard a ship (Poland,
1962) and the other may have been the result of testing
aerosolized smallpox (U.S.S.R, 1972) [21-23]. A fourth
outbreak was excluded because the number of cases in
each generation was not documented; therefore, the ini-
tial reproductive rate (R) could not be derived from the
data (United States or U.S., 1946) [24]. The remaining 45
original outbreaks occurred over a thirty-year period in
different countries and under different circumstances. The
majority of reported outbreaks occurred in three coun-
Literature Search Figure 1
Literature Search. 1389 publications were selected and 45 post World War ll outbreaks were identified for analysis.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:126 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/126
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tries: 18 (40%) in the United Kingdom (U.K.), 8 (18%) in
the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), and 3 (7%) in
the U.S.S.R. (Tables 1 and 2). Most resulted from involved
index cases imported from endemic countries, but two
outbreaks were the result of laboratory exposure [25,26].
Although published or listed as single outbreaks, four out-
breaks included multiple epidemiologically distinct com-
ponents, such as occurred when a case travelled to a
different region resulting in a secondary outbreak in the
new area (see reference column and footnotes for Table
2). The components of these four outbreaks were treated
as 10 separate outbreaks so that an effective total of 51
outbreaks were analyzed [21,27-29]. For all 51 outbreaks,
available information included the total number of gener-
ations and cases, the number of cases in each generation,
the duration of the outbreak, and the number of deaths
(Tables 1 and 2). Thirty of the outbreaks could also be cat-
egorized by setting and had detailed information on the
generation that the outbreak was identified, control meas-
ures, clinical presentation of the index case, and the
number of missed cases (Table 2).
Characteristics of the 51 outbreaks
The median initial reproduction rate (R) across all 51 out-
breaks was 2 with a range of 0 to 38 (Table 3, Figure 2a).
About half had an initial R of 1 or less, and over two-thirds
had an initial R of 3 or less. The median duration, as meas-
ured by number of generations, was 1 with a range of 0 to
9 (Table 3, Figure 2b). About a third did not extend
beyond the index generation, and nearly three quarters
lasted for 3 or fewer generations. The median outbreak
size, as measured by the total number of cases, was 4 with
a range of 1 to 134 cases (Table 3, Figure 2c). About half
involved 3 or fewer cases, and two-thirds involved 15 or
fewer cases. The median number of deaths was 1 with a
range of 0 to 26 (Table 3, Figure 2d). About two-fifths
involved no deaths, and three quarters involved 3 or fewer
deaths.
Outbreaks with greater initial R-values tended to be larger
and longer. For example, in outbreaks with an initial R of
5 or less versus more than 5, median values for the total
number of cases and generations were 2 versus 23 and 1
versus 2.5 respectively.
Characteristics of the 30 outbreaks reported in detail
There was no temporal trend in the amount of detail
reported, but the thirty outbreaks reported in detail typi-
cally had a larger R (median 2 vs.0), lasted more genera-
tions (median 2 vs. 0), and had more total cases (median
13 vs. 1) and deaths (median 2 vs. 0) compared to less-
detailed outbreaks (Table 3, Figures 2a–d). In the detailed
outbreaks, most of the index cases had atypical (mild) or
hemorrhagic disease. Because these clinical presentations
of smallpox are less common, many of these index cases
were missed or not diagnosed with smallpox at the time
of illness. The majority of index cases were infected
Table 1: Outbreaks reported with fewer details, not classifiable by setting
YEAR COUNTRY, CITY REFERENCE INITIAL R TOTAL 
CASES
NUMBER OF 
GENERATIO
NS
NUMBER OF 
DEATHS
1 1958 Fed. Rep. Germany, Heidelberg [21] 10 20 3 2
2 1959 United Kingdom, Liverpool [21] 0 1 0 0
3 1959 German Dem. Rep., Berlin [21] 0 1 0 0
4 1959 USSR, Moscow [21] 19 46 3 3
5 1960 United Kingdom, London [21] 0 1 0 0
6 1961 Spain, Madrid [21] 13 17 2 3
7 1961 Fed. Rep. Germany, Ansbach [21] 2 4 2 1
8 1961 USSR, Moscow [21] 0 1 0 0
9 1961 Belgium, Brussles [21] 0 1 0 1
10 1961 USSR, Kirovabad [21] 0 1 0 0
11 1961 Fed. Rep. Germany, Lammersdorf [21] 3 33 4 1
12 1962 United Kingdom, London [21] 2 3 1 0
13 1963 Poland, Gdansk [21] 0 1 0 0
14 1963 Switzerland, Zurich [21] 0 1 0 0
15 1967 Fed. Rep. Germany, Regensburg [21] 1 2 1 0
16 1967 Czechoslovakia, Prague [21] 0 1 0 0
17 1967 Fed. Rep. Germany, Hanover [21] 0 1 0 0
18 1967 United Kingdom, London [21] 1 2 1 0
19 1968 United Kingdom, London [21] 0 1 0 0
20 1968 Belgium, Namur [21] 0 1 0 0
21 1973 United Kingdom, London [21] 0 1 0 0BMC Public Health 2006, 6:126 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/126
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Table 2: Outbreaks reported with more details, classifiable by setting
YEAR COUNTRY, CITY REFE
RENC
E(S)
PROP
ORTI
ON 
OF 
CASE
S 
ACQ
UIRE
D 
WITH
IN A 
HOSP
ITAL 
INITI
AL R
TOT
AL 
CASE
S
NUM
BER 
OF 
DEAT
HS
NUM
BER 
OF 
GENE
RA-
TION
S
GENE
RATI
ON 
OUT
BREA
K 
IDEN
TIFIE
D
NUM
BER 
OF 
CASE
S 
NOT 
INITI
ALLY 
DIAG
NOSE
D 
(MISS
ED 
CASE
S)
CLINIC
AL 
PRESEN
TATIO
N OF 
INDEX 
CASE*
HOSPITAL OUTBREAKS
1 1947 United States, New York [30] 0.91 4 12 2 2 1 1 Hemorrh
agic
2 1950 United Kingdom, Glasgow [29] 1.00 20 21 3 1 1 1 Atypical
3 1952 France, Marseille(1) [27] 0.97 24 40 4 3 0 0 Not clear 
from 
texta
4 1954 France, Vannes [27, 38] 0.88 12 74b 16 3 1 2 Atypical
5 1 9 6 1 U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  B r o m w i c h [ 2 1 ,  2 8 ] 1 . 0 0 120100 T y p i c a l
6 1961 United Kingdom, Bradford [21, 28, 
34]
1.00 10 14 6 2 1 1 Atypical
7 1962 United Kingdom, Cardiff (2) [ 2 1 ,  2 8 ] 1 . 0 0 1 82 11 3 2 1 1 H e m o r r h
agic
8 1 9 6 3 P o l a n d ,  L o d z ( 3 ) [ 3 9 ] 1 . 0 0 341100 H e m o r r h
agic
9 1969 Meschede [20, 31] 1.00 17 20 4 2 0 0 Typical
10 1972 Yugoslavia, Kosovo (4) [21] 0.86 38 43 9 2 1 38 Hemorrh
agic
11 1 9 7 3 U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  L o n d o n [ 2 1 ,  2 5 ] 1 . 0 0 242200 T y p i c a l
MIXED OUTBREAKS
12 1947 United Kingdom, Barnsley [29] 0.38 5 17 0 3 0 1 Atypical
13 1949 United States, Hidalgo 
County
[ 4 0 ] 0 . 3 3 281215 A t y p i c a l
14 1950 United Kingdom, Brighton [29] 0.46 2 29 10 4 1 3 Atypical
15 1952 France, Marseille(1) [27] 0.50 131200 N o t  c l e a r  
from 
texta
16 1961 Dusseldorf [21, 35] 0.50 2 5c 2200 T y p i c a l
17 1963 Poland, Wroclaw (3) [21, 33] 0.48 2 90 6 6 2 4 Atypical
18 1963 Sweden, Stockholm [21, 36] 0.44d 4 27 4 6 2 5 Atypical
19 1972 Yugoslavia, Kosovo (4) [21] 0.36 11 134 26 3 2 12 Atypical
COMMUNITY OUTBREAKS
20 1947 United Kingdom, Bilston [29] 0.04 2 28 1 9 1 3 Atypical
21 1953 United Kingdom, Industrial 
Pennines
[29] 0.23 4 39 11 6 1 8 Atypical
22 1961 United Kingdom, London [21] 
[28]
0 . 0 0 231100 A t y p i c a l
23 1962 United Kingdom, 
Birmingham
[21] 
[28]
0 . 0 0 010000 T y p i c a l
24 1962 United Kingdom, Cardiff (2) [21] 
[28]
0 . 0 0 121101 T y p i c a l
25 1 9 6 2 C a n a d a ,  T o r o n t o [ 2 1 ] 0 . 0 0 010000 T y p i c a l
26 1962 United Kingdom, Cardiff (2) [21] 
[28]
0.17 6 25 6 3 1 1 Hemorrh
agic
27 1 9 6 3 P o l a n d ,  O p o l e  ( 3 ) [ 4 1 ] 0 . 0 0 140100 A t y p i c a l
28 1965 Fed. Rep. Germany, 
Kulmbach
[21] 
[37]
0.00 0 1e 0000 T y p i c a lBMC Public Health 2006, 6:126 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/126
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because of travel in smallpox endemic countries, and
most countries required a certificate of vaccination for
travel. Two of the index cases were infected as a result of
laboratory exposure [25,26]. All of these 30 outbreaks
were managed by ring vaccination and case isolation.
Although a few outbreaks used additional control meas-
ures, we are unable to evaluate the efficacy of these other
strategies. These included mass vaccination (used in New
York City, U.S., 1947 and Kosovo, Yugoslavia, 1972),
quarantine (used in Kosovo, Yugoslavia, 1947) and
administration of Vaccinia Immune Globulin (used in
Meschede, Germany, 1969) [20,21,30,31].
Initial reproduction rate
The median initial R across the 30 detailed outbreaks was
2 with a range of 0 to 38 (Table 3, Figure 2a). About a third
had an initial R of 1 or less, and about two thirds had an
initial R of 3 or less. Outbreaks that remained in the com-
munity had a lower initial R (median 1) than those that
were hospital based from the first generation (median 12)
(Table 3, Figure 3a). Mixed outbreaks, which generally
started in the community and later spread through hospi-
tal contacts, had an intermediate initial R (median 2)
(Table 3, Figure 3a). The initial R was smaller when the
index case(s) had a typical versus atypical or hemorrhagic
presentation (medians 1 vs. 4 or 5, respectively), and
when the index case was identified as smallpox versus
unrecognized (median 1 vs. 5) (Table 3, Figures 3b and
3c). The effect was most pronounced in hospital out-
breaks – median initial R's for identified versus unidenti-
fied index cases in hospital outbreaks were 3 versus 15,
but the same values for community and mixed outbreaks
were 1 versus 4, and 2 versus 2, respectively.
Other characteristics
The median duration for 30 outbreaks was 2 generations
with a range is 0 to 9 generations (Table 3, Figure 2b).
About a third did not extend beyond the first generation,
Table 3: Summary of parameters for 51 post-World War II Western European and North American smallpox outbreaks.
Number of Outbreaks 
Identified
Median for Initial R Median for Number of 
Generations
Median for Number of 
Total Cases
Median for Number of 
Deaths
O v e r a l l 5 1 2141
Reporting Status
I n c o m p l e t e l y  r e p o r t e d 2 1 0010
Reported in detail 30 2 2 13 2
Outbreak Setting
Community 11 1121
Mixed 8 2 3 22 3
Hospital 11 12 2 20 4
Clinical Presentation of Index Case
Hemorrhagic 6 5 2 16.5 4
Atypical* 13 4 3 27 4
T y p i c a l 91121
Index Case Identified as Smallpox
No 14 5 3 27.5 6
Y e s 1 6 1131
* Atypical: index cases with a milder illness (usually seen with a previous vaccination for smallpox) or a rash not characteristic of smallpox.
29 1 9 7 0D e n m a r k ,  S k o d s b o r g[ 2 1 ] 0 . 0 0 121100 H e m o r r h
agic
30 1978 United Kingdom, 
Birmingham
[ 2 6 ] 0 . 0 0 121100 T y p i c a l
* Atypical: index cases with a milder illness (usually seen with a previous vaccination for smallpox) or a rash not characteristic of smallpox. Detailed 
outbreaks (from Table 2) analyzed by components:
(1) Outbreak from Marseille, France (1952) broken into two components: Entries 3 and 15 [27].
(2)Outbreak from Cardiff, U.K.(1963)broken into three components: Entries7, 24 and 26 [21, 28].
(3) Outbreak from Poland (1963) broken into three components: Entries 8, 17 and 27 [41].
(4)Outbreak from Kosovo, Yugoslavia (1972) broken into two components: Entries 10 and 19 [21].
Footnotes for Table 2:
a Nature of the index cases was not clear from the text (limited information) [27].
b Total number of cases listed as 74, consistent with text [38] and second reference [27].
c Total number of cases listed as 5 [28, 34] ; 6 is listed in World Health Organization Table 23.4 [21].
d Proportion of hospital acquired cases listed as 0.44 because three nurses infected as a result of household exposure and were setting excluded as 
hospital contacts [21, 36].
e Total number of cases listed as 1 [37]; 2 is listed in World Health Organization Table 23.4 [21].
Table 2: Outbreaks reported with more details, classifiable by setting (Continued)BMC Public Health 2006, 6:126 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/126
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Characteristics of European and North American Smallpox Outbreaks Figure 2
Characteristics of European and North American Smallpox Outbreaks. Characteristics of outbreaks reported in 
detail compared to incompletely reported outbreaks: initial reproductive rate (Figure 2a), outbreak duration (Figure 2b), out-
break size (Figure 2c), and number of deaths (Figure 2d). Dark bars: characteristics of 30 outbreaks reported in detail. Light 
bars: characteristics of 21 incompletely reported outbreaks.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:126 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/126
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Initial Reproductive Rate (Median ---) Figure 3
Initial Reproductive Rate (Median ---). Initial effective reproduction rate (initial R) in 30 post-World War II Western 
European and North American smallpox outbreaks by setting (Figure 3a), clinical presentation of the index case (Figure 3b), 
and identification of the index case with smallpox (Figure 3c).BMC Public Health 2006, 6:126 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/126
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and another third lasted for only through the second gen-
eration. Outbreaks that remained in the community
lasted a median of 1 generation, while those that were
hospital-based lasted a median of 2 generations and those
that were mixed lasted a median of 3 generations (Table
3). Outbreaks tended to be shorter when the index case
was typical compared to atypical or hemorrhagic (median
number of generations 1 vs. 3 vs. 2, respectively) and
when the index case was identified (median number of
generations 1 vs. 3) (Table 3). The duration of hospital
outbreaks was not affected by the identification of the
index cases, but the duration of mixed and community
outbreaks lasted up to 6 and 9 generations, respectively,
when index cases were unidentified.
The median outbreak size, as measured by the total
number of cases, was 13 with a range of 1 to 134 cases
(Table 3, Figure 2c). There were approximately equal pro-
portions of small (total number of cases less than 5) and
large (total over 20) outbreaks (Table 2). Outbreaks that
remained in the community involved a median of 2 cases,
while those that were hospital based involved a median of
20 cases and those that were mixed had a median of 22
cases (Table 3). Outbreaks tended to be smaller when the
index case was typical versus atypical or hemorrhagic
(median number of cases 2 vs. 27 vs. 16.5) and when the
index case was identified (median number of cases 3 vs.
27.5) (Table 3). The outbreak size was similarly small
across all 3 settings when the index case was identified
and similarly large across the settings when it was not.
The median number of deaths was 2 with a range of 0 to
26 (Table 3, Figure 2d). About one-fifth involved no
deaths, and four fifths involved 4 or fewer deaths (Table
2). Community, hospital based, and mixed outbreaks had
medians of 1, 4, and 3 deaths, respectively (Table 3); how-
ever, case fatality rates were 0.24, 0.20 and 0.17. The
number of deaths was smaller if the index case was iden-
tified (median equals 1 vs. 6, Table 3). The case fatality
rate was highest if the index case presented with hemor-
rhagic-type smallpox.
There was a strong association between typical presenta-
tion and early identification of index cases: index cases
were identified as smallpox in 9 of 9 outbreaks when the
presentation was typical, 3 of 13 when it was atypical, and
2 of 6 when it was hemorrhagic. This relationship aids in
the understanding of outbreak severity. For example, 93%
of outbreaks had greater than 10 cases when the index
case was not identified. Moreover, in all of these larger
outbreaks, the index cases were atypical or hemorrhagic.
When the index case was identified, most outbreaks had
less than 10 cases regardless of whether the index case was
typical, atypical, or hemorrhagic.
Discussion
Descriptions of smallpox transmission are important to
biosecurity planning, especially since some planning
efforts have posited outbreaks resulting in numbers of
cases – hundreds, thousands, or more – that are very large
relative to the clinical experience shortly before eradica-
tion of the natural disease [32]. In a systematic review
designed to provide an understanding of smallpox trans-
mission patterns, we identified and analyzed what were
effectively 51 smallpox outbreaks from post-1945 Europe
and North America. In these outbreaks, we found a
median of 4 total cases and 1 death.
The characteristics of the outbreaks varied greatly: one
outbreak with an initial R of 11 involved 134 people and
caused 26 deaths over only 3 generations of spread;
another outbreak with initial R of only 2 involved 28 cases
but lasted 9 generations. However, most outbreaks were
small and contained within a few generations: 31 percent
involved only one case, 41 percent caused no deaths, and
31 percent had an initial R of 0 (i.e., no first generation
cases).
Examination of outbreaks within categories of setting,
identification of the index case, and clinical characteristics
provided additional insights. By reviewing original publi-
cations, we were able to categorize and analyze many out-
breaks by setting. For example, were able to review the
original publications for eight outbreaks documented by
the WHO [25,26,28,33-37] as well as, identify thirteen
additional outbreaks [20,27,29-31,38-41]. Several of
these outbreaks also had epidemiologically distinct com-
ponents, resulting in 51 effective outbreaks for analysis.
Many (six out of eleven) of the hospital outbreaks were
only found in the above-mentioned additional outbreaks
[20,27,29,30,38,39]. Hospital outbreaks had higher ini-
tial reproductive rates than either community or mixed
outbreaks, and had more cases and deaths than did com-
munity types. Moreover, the interaction of identification
and setting in the studied outbreaks reveals a pattern sim-
ilar to that seen in frequently unrecognized infectious dis-
eases, such as tuberculosis and, more recently, SARS [42].
When index cases were identified, control is established
early and both the median initial R and the number of
generations were similarly low in all 3 settings. When the
index cases were unidentified, a large increase in the
median initial R was seen only in the hospital setting and
a large increase in the number of generations was seen
only in community and mixed settings. This is consistent
with the observation that, within the close quarters of an
institution, the transmission of smallpox is relatively
effective before identification and containment measures
are quite effective after identification. This impression is
reinforced by examination of the two shipboard out-BMC Public Health 2006, 6:126 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/126
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breaks that were excluded from the analysis. In these out-
breaks, the initial R's were 6 and 25, respectively, but
recognition was followed by control within two genera-
tions [22].
In community outbreaks, transmission is intrinsically less
effective. The consequence of missed initial identification
in the community was not an elevated initial R, but an
increase in the length of the outbreaks. The longer out-
breaks may be due to a decrease in the effectiveness of
containment measures after initial spread in the commu-
nity, possibly because of the greater difficulty of tracking
and managing cases in that setting. Nonetheless, all of the
30 outbreaks reported in detail were brought under con-
trol, generally by case isolation and ring vaccination.
Other measures were rarely used (mass vaccination was
used in the New York City, 1947 outbreak and mass vac-
cination and quarantine were used in the Kosovo, 1972
outbreak [21,30]) and there is limited information on the
efficacy of these additional measures. It should also be
noted that newer treatment modalities, such as Cidofovir,
have been shown to be protective in animal studies
against vaccinia and other orthopox viruses (monkeypox
and cowpox) after exposure [43,44].
Outbreaks beginning with an atypical or hemorrhagic ver-
sus a typical presentation of the index case had more
cases, a higher initial transmission rate, and were some-
what longer. This is related to the ease of initial diagnosis:
only non-typical cases were mis-identified, and outbreaks
in which the index case was mis-identified were generally
larger, deadlier, longer, and had a median initial R of 5
compared to 1 if the case was identified. We speculate that
the large difference in initial R is because, when the index
case is identified, this parameter is effectively the initial
reproductive rate with early institution of control meas-
ures. However, it is clear that the types of outbreaks seen
in developed countries in the second half of the 20th cen-
tury were well and quickly controlled.
Despite searching several databases, using broad searches,
scanning nearly 6,000 titles, and reviewing papers in sev-
eral languages, our requirement that included epidemics
involve post-World War II western populations limited us
to identifying only 45 separate outbreaks, some of which
were divided for analysis. The majority of the outbreaks
were from only three countries, suggesting that outbreaks
from certain countries were more likely to have been doc-
umented. The 30 outbreaks reported in detail were larger
than the 21 that were briefly reported; it is probable that
smaller outbreaks were not routinely published in detail
because outbreaks were still relatively common and
smallpox was still endemic in many parts of the world.
This apparent publication bias, however, suggests that
there may have been many unpublished small outbreaks
and that this analysis may overestimate the transmission
potential of smallpox because it is based only on pub-
lished reports.
The recent literature contains several estimates for the
reproductive rate of smallpox. It is difficult to directly
compare our findings and estimates for initial R, the ini-
tial effective reproduction rate for smallpox, to these other
studies. Two of the studies do not use contemporary west-
ern outbreaks. One estimates the basic reproductive rate,
(R0,  a theoretical parameter defined as the expected
number of new infected hosts that an infectious host will
produce in a large randomly mixed population of suscep-
tible individuals [9]), rather than effective reproduction
rate. Specifically, Gani and Leach used epidemic model-
ling of data from 19th Century European smallpox out-
breaks to estimate a R0 of 3.5 to 6.0 [19]. Eichner and
Dietz obtained an R of 6.9 from data on a 1967 outbreak
in Nigeria [5]. Meltzer et al examined post-1961 out-
breaks from countries around the world in estimating an
R of 3 [8].
Our estimate of the overall initial R is quite comparable to
Meltzer et al., but use of any single point estimate for R0
or initial R in policy analysis ignores a main lesson of this
review. This work clearly shows that the pattern, speed,
and duration of an outbreak's spread vary widely accord-
ing to the specific circumstances surrounding an outbreak.
Different smallpox release scenarios should be expected to
yield different results in part because the parameters and
modified natural history of the outbreak itself will vary
with the scenarios. For example, our previous work mod-
elled the outcome of terrorist attacks under different sce-
narios [4]. These scenarios included community based
outbreaks resulting from infected cases riding a busy tran-
sit system and the intentional release of aerosolized small-
pox in airport terminals, and a mixed outbreak resulting
from the release of aerosolized smallpox in a large office
building. Although adjustments had to be made for a
poorly vaccinated population and healthcare workforce,
the understanding of smallpox transmission patterns in
hospital, mixed and community settings, provided impor-
tant insights into how smallpox may spread under differ-
ent attack scenarios.
In a contemporary US population, one might expect
transmission from introduced smallpox to be higher than
we found to be typical. Population density is higher;
mobility is greater, and, though more similar that one
might think, immunity in the contemporary U.S. popula-
tion is likely somewhat lower than in the populations
studied. The healthcare workforce is also poorly vacci-
nated and inexperienced with smallpox. This will decrease
the human resources available for care and containment,
and increase the likelihood that initial cases will beBMC Public Health 2006, 6:126 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/126
Page 11 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
missed. Counterbalancing this is the fact that few index
cases will be vaccinated recently so the likelihood of more
easily recognized typical cases is much higher. As the out-
break scenarios of greatest concern involve intentional
release, outbreaks could be larger and more obvious than
those reviewed, or could involve strains selected or engi-
neered to be more virulent or contagious.
Finally, the outbreak from Kosovo deserves notice because
this region is not as developed or as wealthy as most of the
other countries studied. This outbreak was the largest
identified for this review (N = 176 for both combined hos-
pital and mixed components). Moreover, the hospital and
mixed component of this outbreak had the second highest
(R = 38) and highest (R = 11) initial reproductive rate, and
the hospital component lasted 9 generations (median
number of generations for a hospital outbreak = 2). This
suggests that a smallpox outbreak in a less developed
country with limited resources for healthcare, disease sur-
veillance, and case isolation could be potentially more
devastating than a bioterrorist attack in a Western/indus-
trialized country [44].
Conclusion
It is clear that most post-World War II outbreaks in West-
ern countries were small and had low transmission rates.
This was almost uniformly the case when the index case
presented with typical smallpox and was recognized early.
However, exceptions were common and heterogeneous,
particularly when (usually atypical or hemorrhagic) index
cases were not initially recognized. Initially unrecognized
community outbreaks lasted several generations despite
low initial R values. This suggests that control measures
were less effective in this setting, perhaps because of the
difficulty tracing and vaccinating all cases and contacts. In
contrast, unrecognized hospital outbreaks were control-
led quickly despite high initial R values, suggesting that
control measures worked very well in a closed, contained
setting. Early detection, particularly of patients who do
not present with typical smallpox, coupled with early
implementation of control measures decreases both the
duration and size of outbreaks in all settings.
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